POLICE brutality and abuse of authority are problems law-enforcement agencies worldwide have to contend with. However, in Pakistan, it appears that black sheep in uniform can make a mockery of the law with impunity. As documented in this paper’s Tuesday edition, a number of police officers in Karachi have been involved in kidnappings for ransom in the chaotic metropolis. These include policemen of the rank of SHO and inspector. These crooked cops have kidnapped traders and businessmen, barged into homes and demanded millions of rupees in ransom. In fact, their behaviour has been that of gangland thugs, not officers of the law. One individual even had the gall to use an official police van to collect ransom.
Karachi is certainly not alone when it comes to policemen committing crimes. Despite the sacrifices and efforts of honest officers to fight crime, the image that prevails in Pakistan is of a corrupt, inefficient force that preys on the citizenry and is beholden to its political masters. For many years, officialdom has been talking of police reform, yet few visible changes have been observed in the workings of police departments countrywide. Perhaps the main problem is that the legislative and administrative framework that governs policing here is outdated. Apart from KP, where a new police law was introduced earlier this year, the other provinces and regions of Pakistan either function under the Police Act of 1861, or under a hybrid of this law and the Police Order, 2002. Aping the colonial model has produced dismal results, as today’s challenges are entirely different. Today, rather than worrying about controlling rowdyism or nabbing pickpockets, police officers have to deal with sophisticated and ruthless militants and criminal syndicates. Unless the legal and administrative structure is changed to respond to the needs of the day, criminality within the force will be difficult to eliminate.
Experts have stressed the need for community policing; instead of the image of the police officer as an ‘outsider’, what is needed is the recruitment of bright and service-oriented men and women who are known in their communities and neighbourhoods and are able to build bridges with citizens. Moreover, officers of repute must be given security of tenure and not transferred due to political whims. An independent system of lodging and investigating claims of police abuse must also be instituted. Police officers need to be given competitive service structures, with good pay and benefits; if individuals resort to corrupt practices thereafter, they must be shown the door. The federal, provincial and local governments, and civil society representatives, must all give their input on how to reform the police. Specifically, there are many serving and retired officers of impeccable repute that should be consulted on how to fix the rot. Above all, those who break the law while in uniform must be brought to justice.
A Trump solution
Pakistan has any number of problems great and small, with the rift created at Independence being the greatest and the most impervious to solution. Over the decades there have been many attempts to broker peace. All have failed. The two countries have gone to war thrice. Currently there is an elevated — and escalating — level of tension revolving around the core dispute of Kashmir. The Kashmir issue is a colonial legacy that has proved poisonous in the extreme and continues to do so, but a new player has come to the stage and from an unexpected direction. Donald Trump, President Elect of the United States said on Wednesday November 30 that he is ‘willing to play any role that Pakistan wants…to find solutions to outstanding problems.’ The remark was made in a ‘phone conversation with PM Nawaz Sharif occasioned by the PM calling Mr Trump to congratulate him on his recent victory in the Presidential race. The President-elect went on to say that it would be an honour for him to be thus engaged and that he personally would do what is needed.
Perhaps we should not be surprised as Mr Trump is after all a man of surprises. During the campaign he had referred to a desire to mediate between India and Pakistan saying that the unresolved dispute was ‘a tinderbox’ — in which he is correct, but as ever there are caveats. Thus far none of the Trump team at cabinet level has much — or any — regional diplomatic experience and as far as is known Mr Trump himself has none. Paradoxically this may be no bad thing. No backstory, no taint of colonialism could play well for Mr Trump and his team. Conversely a failure to understand the heavily nuanced relationship could be disastrous, and anyway India would have to be a willing party to any new attempts to resolve the issues as would the people of Kashmir, and there is no suggestion that either has been consulted prior to Mr Trump making his offer. At first sight the Trump offer is outrageous, almost ridiculous, at second look perhaps not much of either after all.
US-Pakistan relations
It is dangerously premature to anticipate the state of US-Pakistan relations under Trump. But he is such a curious phenomenon that we are all in a hurry to unwrap him as if to know whether the package is a gift or an explosive.
Let us see. We know enough about the man and his ideas but precious little about his policies. He is narcissist, imperious and wilful. But he would not have his way. American system hamstrings autocratic and whimsical tendencies unless they enjoy domestic consensus; and that happens only in times of war and often with grave consequences. Post 9/11 wars were a case in point. Here you cannot make policies specially on critical issues without some bipartisan political support. Can Trump do that in a divided nation? No. Yes the Republicans control both Houses but it is a divided party and he is not an authentic Republican.
Now where does this leave the US-Pakistan relationship? Well the honest answer is we don’t know. It is too soon to tell. We have no major foreign policy speech of his to go by and we have no idea who his Secretary of State will be. All we can do at this stage is explore the context that will likely host the relations and look at Trump’s personality and whatever little we know about his national priorities, approach to foreign policy and his advisers. And make an educated guess about the relationship. We don’t have a crystal ball — Trump broke it.
In foreign policy terms his make America great again may translate itself into a nation that is militarily and economically strong and unbound by globalism and multilateralism. And has a free hand to pursue its national interests even unscrupulously as Trump did as a businessman. Simply put, America comes first. He is non ideological and willing to cut a deal with anybody.
The focus will be on economy and domestic issues, and in foreign policy largely on challenges that are related to jobs and economy at home, like trade deals and immigration, and security threats like terrorism specially the IS brand. Much of the geo strategic issues may take a back seat to be handled by the State Department. If history is any guide Presidents who are not very knowledgeable like him end up relying on institutions. And that is what he may do on most issues including US-Pakistan relations. Of course Pentagon and the big military industrial complex will have a big say. But he is not looking to start any wars. In fact the effort will be to extricate Washington from the ongoing conflicts. He may turn out to be the first real post 9/11 President.
He will be tough on China and trade deals and on the Iran nuclear deal and relations with Mexico but I don’t see any big departure in relations with major allies. And even in dealing with China, Iran and Russia if he finds some common interests like cooperating with China on North Korea and with Russia and Iran in fighting the IS he may do it.
President Obama had shifted the focus away from real wars to a Cold War with China. This strategic shift known as pivot to Asia dovetailed with his fondness for India, a country that was to be the linchpin of this grand design to balance China. US-Pakistan relations had got subordinated to this strategy and Obama’s vain efforts to fix the failing Afghanistan war. Not to mention the concern about the jihadists and Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
Under Trump and a resurgent Pentagon the Pivot to Asia may become an exercise to strengthen US military presence in the Asia Pacific rather than over depend on India and other partners. Trump will be close to India but not at the expense of Pakistan since as a businessman he would hate to lose a partner. But he will be hard on a bad partner. Washington can congratulate itself that the pressure on Pakistan to act against the jihadists seems to be working at least in inciting a civil military argument, if nothing else. Trump is not going to give it up specially if he listens to the likes of Newt Gingrich and John Bolton.
Main question will be what to do with the Afghanistan war. If Pentagon has its way the American presence and engagement in Afghanistan will continue. That will mean Pakistan will continue to derive its importance from the war as well as face pressure. But unlike Obama Trump may not feel invested in the war. And like a businessman he may like to cut and run. After all he has lived with bankruptcies. The question at that stage will be who does he outsource the task of cleaning up after? To Islamabad?
My guess is he is not going to walk away from Pakistan. And here is why. There are limits in how far you go in relations with India. India has been a hard country to please more than Pakistan. And US-India relations alone do not fully respond to America’s foreign policy objectives in the region. It is not just America; China too is pivoting to Asia, and to the Middle East, and Pakistan is where the two pivots face off. From Washington’s perspective, Pakistan should not be left entirely dependent on China. Among other reasons for a relationship with Pakistan: it works as a card against India, and as India Pakistan relations also impinge on American interests Washington needs to remain engaged with both the countries, at least for crisis management.
A frustrated Obama concerned about his legacy and a Pentagon angry about failing Afghanistan war had taken it out on Pakistan with the help of a fickle Congress ever sensitive to public opinion that had turned very negative towards Pakistan. Under Trump who will have no personal or political baggage this coalition may disintegrate. What will emerge in its place? We don’t know. All we are certain about at this stage is the uncertainty. And that his foreign policy will not be as scary as we fear.
The economics of land reform
Due to the colonial history of Pakistan, land distribution is highly skewed in favor of political and social elites. According to estimates, four percent of the wealthiest rural landowners own more than fifty percent of all cultivated land in Pakistan. Moreover, fifty percent of the rural families are landless and this number is continuously on the rise.
In order to understand why people are poor, we must start with looking at what kind of work they are doing and how much they are paid. The majority of the rural poor are landless, small peasants who primarily earn their living by working on the land of large landowners.
For large landowners, one of the key economic issues is how to extract work from labourers by offering them as little as possible in return. In order to ensure continuous flow of cheap labour, large landholders adopt a very complex system of labour control. We can list at least three kinds of labour control system.
First, ‘social controls’ – that is, discriminating workers based on caste and other non-economic identities. This is done by imposing cultural and political sanctions on certain castes and groups of people including religious minorities. One of the main purposes of social controls is to keep a check on the upward mobility of agricultural labourers and expand the availability of low-skilled labourers. This way large landowners increase their bargaining position and keepwages as low as possible.
The second kind of labour control is ‘environmental controls’. Rural spaces are kept in isolation through inadequate infrastructure and communication facilities. This is accompanied by low levels of public and private investment in education and healthcare facilities in rural spaces. This does not only lower the living standard of the rural poor but also reduces the linkages between the rural poor across villages and regions. Moreover, it also keeps a check on the job prospects of the rural poor outside their own village. As a result, the bargaining power of large landholders increases and the wages of rural workers remain low.
The third kind of labor control is ‘institutional controls’. Institutions are set up in a way that they create a system of patronage. Laws, regulations and state policies are designed to empower large landowners and make the rural poor dependent on them. This keeps a downward pressure on the wages of agricultural workers.
Together these three forms of social controls reinforce each other and perpetuate poverty among working people in rural spaces.
Progressive economists have long suggested land reforms to help alleviate rural poverty. Land reforms refer to a set of policies in which land is redistributed from large landowners to landless and small peasants. But critics of land reforms have argued that redistribution of wealth distorts market incentives and mechanisms. They also argue that a developing country like Pakistan is under performing on the economic front because markets are not allowed to operate efficiently. In other words, critics of land reform argue that it is not a question of ‘distribution’ but a matter of ‘well-functioning markets’.
Given the ideological dominance of the critics of land reforms (mainstream economists), I am going to use their theoretical constructs to make an argument in favour of agrarian land reforms. Agrarian markets are not operating efficiently because of unequal distribution of land and in order for agrarian markets to operate efficiently, land reforms are essential.
One of the most central themes of mainstream economic theory is ‘efficiency’. According to the rationale of efficiency, each factor of production should be sold at its correct price. In other words, people should not be charged different prices for the same good. The second key assumption of mainstream economic theory is that people respond to prices (incentives). That is, if the price of a good goes up then people demand less of that good and vice versa.
Now let’s look at the agrarian markets in Pakistan. Factor markets in the rural economy of Pakistan are fragmented. In simple words, the price you pay for a factor of production (labor, land and capital) depends on your socio-economic class. For example, a large landholder pays a lower price for capital vis-à-vis landless or small landholders. Credit is available to large landowners at much cheaper rates vis-à-vis a small landholders.
Similarly, land markets in rural spaces are highly fragmented and localised. Large landowners are highly unlikely to sell their land even if it is sitting idle. Land gives monopsony power to large landowners and in order to maintain their monopsony power, large landowners are not using land efficiently. (Monopsony refers to a situation in which there is only one employer and tons of people looking for employment). In most villages of Pakistan, the only possible job a landless or small landholder can find is cultivating the land of large landowner. Aware of this fact, large landowners hire them at much lower wages than the ‘true’ market wage.
On the other hand, small landholders are land-scarce. According to a simple supply and demand principle, if a resource is scarce, its price is higher. Thus the implicit rental rate of land for small landholders is much higher vis-à-vis large landowners who are land-abundant.
Landless workers and small landholders on average pay a much higher price for credit (capital) as compared to large landholders. Therefore, it is obvious that small and large landholders are going to behave in opposite ways (remember: people respond to incentives). That is why we observe that large landholders use higher capital-to-labour ratio in agricultural production as compared to small landholders. Similarly, large landholders are going to use higher land-to-labor ratio as well.
Small landholders are going to use lower capital-to-labour ratio and lower land-to-labour ratio. In other words, small landholders use more labor intensive techniques of production. Therefore, if we have land reforms which lead to an economy full of small landholdings, more employment will be generated. Similarly, small landholdings use a higher proportion of labour per acre of land as compared to large landholdings. Thus we can expect a much higher yield per acre in the post-land reform economy.
Multiple empirical studies consistently show an inverse relationship between farm size and output per acre. That is, on average small landholdings yield more output as compared to large landholdings. Thus land reforms would boost agricultural output in Pakistan.
One can argue over how using more labour intensive techniques of production is more efficient for the overall agrarian economy as compared to capital intensive methods. The answer is that it depends on the resource endowment of a country. Given that Pakistan is a capital-scarce, land-scarce and labour-abundant economy, it makes total economic sense to use labour intensive methods of production. This will not only create more employment but will also enhance overall efficiency in the agrarian economy.
It is very clear that agrarian markets in Pakistan can’t operate efficiently and rural poverty cannot be eliminated as long as systems of labour control and monopsony power remain in the hand of large landowners. Thus land reforms is an appropriate economic response to end rural poverty.
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